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NOTE








“There is very small quantity of real fiction in the world; and the
same images, with very little variation, have served
all the authors who have ever written.”2
AN INTRODUCTION OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS
Imagine Angela Ridges is a world-famous author. Ten years ago, a
string of personal tragedies motivated her to write her first novel. She
wrote as an escape from her reality and her books resonated with mil-
lions. Her second release, the first installment of the They Walk Amongst
Us trilogy, chronicled the Downey family’s ongoing battle against the
supernatural. It became the bestselling, young adult book series of all
time. She worked over eight years to create the extensive character list
and mind-blowing plot twists of her fantastical universe. To date, it re-
mains her most critically acclaimed work. Although she is currently
working on a different project, Angela plans to revisit her trilogy in fu-
1 BATMAN: THE MOVIE (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1966).
* J.D., 2016, Golden Gate University School of Law; B.A., 2008, University of California,
Berkeley.  The author would like to thank Professor William Gallagher and the entire Golden Gate
University Law Review staff for their invaluable advice, meticulous edits, and tremendous help with
this Note. The author would also like to extend special thanks to her family and friends for their
unwavering love and encouragement with everything.
2 SAMUEL JOHNSON & JAMES MACAULAY, DOCTOR JOHNSON: HIS LIFE, WORKS & TABLE
TALK 86 (T. Fisher Unwin, Centenary ed. 1884).
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ture crossover novels. She knows each of her minor characters have a
story of their own to tell.
Now imagine Jackson Akers is one of her many adoring fans. Ex-
actly six months ago, Jackson met Angela at a book signing event he
attended. He confided his hope of becoming a writer, and she inspired
him to pursue his dreams. Jackson started by posting short stories on
various fan fiction sites. Within a couple months, his stories garnered so
much publicity he launched a website solely for his own postings. You
see, Jackson used one of the minor characters from the They Walk
Amongst Us trilogy as his heroine. The character was easily recognized
by Angela’s legions of fans, making Jackson’s collection an instant suc-
cess. Within that same year Dream Genie Publishing offered to publish
Jackson’s collection into a standalone novel.
A literary work of fiction intricately weaves plotlines, characters,
conflicts, settings, and resolutions into one cohesive story.3 It is this
unique arrangement of essential elements, which forms an author’s artis-
tic expression.4 Copyright law protects this artistic expression by grant-
ing exclusive rights that provide financial incentives for creating new
works of art; while still encouraging others to freely build on raw ideas
and elements left within the public domain.5 In addition, copyright law
serves as the legal mechanism to control whether to reproduce, redistrib-
ute, and perform the work, as well as whether to prepare derivative
works.6
Therefore, it is important to set limits on copyright protection, as it
has the capacity to both enhance and diminish creativity.7 As Angela
spent ten years refining her craft and making her characters relatable to
readers, it is only fitting she reaps the financial benefits of her labor.
Conversely, Jackson created an original work himself. While Angela’s
character did serve as the catalyst to his creativity, the plotlines, con-
flicts, and resolutions were distinctively his own. There is a thin line
between encouraging new works of authorship and discouraging subse-
quent authors who may fear their work might be found substantially sim-
3 Katie Kazoo, The Five Essential Elements of a Story, KATIE KAZOO CLASSROOM CREW,
http://www.katiekazoo.com/pdf/KK_FiveEssentialElements.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2016).
4 See Samuel J. Coe, Note, The Story of a Character: Establishing the Limits of Independent
Copyright Protection for Literary Characters, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1305, 1310 (2011).
5 See id. at 1305.
6 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
7 See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of
1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 590, 590-91 (1987).
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ilar to preexisting works.8 This thin line exists in the construction of all
fictional characters.9
In a recent case, DC Comics v. Towle, the Ninth Circuit attempts to
reconcile the rigid idea/expression dichotomy10 inherent in copyright
protection for fictional characters.11 Towle analyzes when it is appropri-
ate to apply copyright protection to fictional characters that are individ-
ual parts of an entire work.12 Since 1939, DC Comics has owned the
copyright for comic books featuring the story of Batman, the world-fa-
mous Caped Crusader, who protects Gotham City from various vil-
lains.13 Introduced in 1941, the Batmobile is a highly technological
automobile used as Batman’s primary mode of transportation.14 Defen-
dant, Mark Towle, (“Towle”) owns Gotham Garage, where he builds and
sells model replicas of automobiles featured in movies and television
shows.15 Using its fame to market his company and attract collectors,
Towle advertises some of his models as the Batmobile.16 DC Comics
filed suit alleging an infringement of its exclusive rights under copyright
law.17 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Batmobile, as a fictional
character part of a larger work of art, is entitled to copyright protection.
Therefore, Towle “infringed upon DC’s property rights when he pro-
duced unauthorized derivative works.”18
8 Jasmina Zecevic, Article, Distinctly Delineated Fictional Characters That Constitute the
Story Being Told: Who Are They and Do They Deserve Independent Copyright Protection?, 8 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 365, 367 (2006) (comparing how granting fictional characters automatic copy-
right protection limits the raw material available to subsequent authors, with how denying copyright
protection altogether dampens the incentive for an original author to labor over character
development).
9 Id.
10 The idea/expression dichotomy is rooted within two Constitutional concepts: the Copyright
Clause and the First Amendment. Bikram’s Yoga College of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC,
803 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 2015). Under the Copyright Clause, Congress grants authors exclusive
rights to their original expressions, while promoting the expansion of ideas and information found
within those original expressions. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499
U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991). Copyright law also creates “a built-in First Amendment accommodation”
when it distinguishes between ideas and expressions and only protects the latter. Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); see generally 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990). Therefore, the “idea/expression
dichotomy strike[s] a definitional balance . . . by permitting free communication of facts while still
protecting an author’s expression.” Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S.
539, 556 (1985).
11 DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 1015.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 1017.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1027.
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In reaching its decision, the court discussed three factors to deter-
mine whether it is appropriate to apply copyright protections to fictional
characters in a comic book, television show, or movie.19 The character
must (1) have “physical as well as conceptual qualities,” (2) be “suffi-
ciently delineated,” and (3) be “especially distinctive” and “contain some
unique elements of expression.”20 Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately
reached the appropriate outcome by protecting the Batmobile, these three
factors do not ensure a fair and just result in all similar cases. First, this
three-part test merely combines three standards already in use.21 Second,
it does not offer concrete guidance with regard to fictional characters in
literary works.22 Third, it fails to address the utilitarian function of an
automobile.23
Section I of this Note presents the history and purpose of copyright
law by giving a brief background of its origin. It discusses how courts
have since expanded copyright coverage to individual fictional charac-
ters, and chronicles the various challenges faced in applying the law.
Section I also provides relevant facts and procedural history for the case.
Section II examines the Ninth Circuit’s discussion and holding. Section
III discusses the inherent limitations of the three-part test used in the
decision. It explains the importance of rejecting categorical protection
and analyzing copyright for all fictional characters on a case-by-case ba-
sis.24 Section III also suggests three additional factors the court should
consider when evaluating such issues. Finally, Section IV concludes that
although the Ninth Circuit reached the appropriate result with regards to
the Batmobile, the presented factors would better guide future courts to
consistent and fair decisions.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
A. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyright law originates from the Constitution granting Congress
authority “to promote the progress of Science and the useful Arts, by
securing for limited times to authors or inventors the exclusive right to
19 Id. at 1019-23.
20 Id. at 1021.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1019.
23 Id. at 1019-20.
24 Coe, supra note 4, at 1309-10 (rejecting automatic copyright protection for fictional
characters).
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their respective writings and discoveries.”25 Copyright protection applies
to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion.”26 Essentially, copyright law protects “tangible, original expres-
sions of ideas, not ideas themselves.”27
Under the current copyright statute, registration is not required for
copyright protection.28 It is granted automatically upon the creation of an
original work of authorship.29 While the United States Copyright Office
may issue a certificate, the courts ultimately determine when a work is
protected.30 To qualify, there must be a slight or minimal degree of crea-
tive effort, resulting in an author’s independent creation.31 “[N]o matter
how crude, humble[,] or obvious” the creative spark may be, the work
need only be original and not copied.32 Pursuant to the United States
Code, there is a finite list of categories automatically protected under this
provision—with fictional characters noticeably absent from the list.33
Judge Learned Hand first penned the concept of copyright protection
for fictional characters when he suggested they might be shielded “quite
independently of the ‘plot.’”34 In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corpora-
tion, the author of Abie’s Irish Rose alleged the studio copied his play
with The Cohens and The Kellys.35 In both works, the child of a Jewish
family married the child of a Catholic family causing a rift between the
parents.36 In both works, the families reconciled only after a grandchild
was born.37 The court disfavored granting copyright protection to such
stock characters because doing so would give exclusive rights to authors
who simply made immaterial variations to unoriginal ideas.38 But even
though the court denied copyright protection for the fictional characters
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Towle opinion discussed, in great detail, the historical
progression of copyright law for fictional characters. Section I limits its discussion to a brief history
of origination and overall purpose. Section II will provide a more expansive history by discussing
how the court reached its holding. See Towle, 802 F.3d at 1019-21.
26 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990).
27 Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 533 (5th Cir. 1994) (em-
phasis added); see generally 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990).
28 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:1 (2015).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345-46 (1991).
32 Id.
33 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990).
34 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
35 Id. at 120.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 120-21.
38 Id.
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in this case, it opened the door for fictional characters in the future.39 It
stated “the less developed the character[ ], the less [it] can be copy-
righted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking [it] too indis-
tinctly.”40 This test extended copyright protection to “distinctly
delineated” characters.41
Since the Second Circuit failed to define what constitutes a “dis-
tinctly delineated” character in Nichols, the Ninth Circuit attempted to
impart clearer guidelines.42 In Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc., the author of The Maltese Falcon sold
limited rights to the studio for defined uses of his story.43 He argued that
since his individual characters were not included in the original bargain,
he did not infringe by using the same characters in subsequent writings
or by granting others the exclusive rights to the characters.44 The court
held it necessary to analyze the character within the entirety of the work
because when characters were merely vehicles to tell the story, those
vehicles were not protected.45 This new test expanded copyright protec-
tion to characters that closely mirror the “story being told.”46
Both the “distinctly delineated” and “story being told” tests lacked
definitive structure, causing numerous problems with consistency and
application.47 First, the tests require judges to act as literary critics arbi-
trarily deciding which characters were distinguished enough to warrant
copyright protection.48 In Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., the
court found Tarzan to be distinctively well developed and delineated
enough to be copyrightable.49 The court said: “Tarzan is the ape-man. He
is an individual closely in tune with his jungle environment, able to com-
municate with animals yet able to experience human emotions. He is
athletic, innocent, youthful, gentle[,] and strong. He is Tarzan.”50 At
best, the court’s characterization served as a generic description of a type
39 See generally Dean D. Niro, Protecting Characters Through Copyright Law: Paving a
New Road Upon Which Literary, Graphic, and Motion Picture Characters Can All Travel, 41
DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 363-365 (1992).
40 Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
41 See id. at 122-23.
42 Niro, supra note 39, at 364.
43 Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 948 (9th Cir.
1954).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 950.
46 See id.
47 Zecevic, supra note 8, at 372-73.
48 Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, Wis. L. Rev. 429,
May-June 1986, at 456-57.
49 Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
50 Id.
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fitting similar circumstances.51 It offered nothing to demonstrate why
Tarzan was “distinctly delineated” from other like characters.52 Surely
another athletic, innocent, youthful, gentle, and strong character could
talk to animals and be in tune with the jungle without infringing on
Tarzan: Kipling’s Mowgli, for instance.53
Second, judges often misapply the standard, leading to the overpro-
tection of characters.54 In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus-
tries, Inc., Universal filed a claim against a manufacturer for inscribing
“E.T. Phone Home!” and “I Love You, E.T.” on their mugs, pencil hold-
ers, and t-shirts.55 The court found E.T. from E.T.: The Extra-Terrestrial
to be a “unique and distinctive character [with whom] the movie re-
volves.”56 The court said the name E.T. was “highly distinctive and . . .
inseparable from the identity of the character.”57 Over-focused on find-
ing protection, the court basically copyrighted the name E.T.,58 not the
character.
Third, neither test necessarily protects the most developed characters
in literary works.59 Flat characters, though well defined by consistent and
unyielding traits, remain unchanged by circumstance, as they do not have
the ability to adapt and grow with new situations.60 The most fully
human, well-rounded characters are often intimately bound to the context
of their stories and remembered through their connections with specific
scenes.61 It is the exact circumstance of their fictional situation that
makes them unapologetically who they are.62 Jean-Baptiste Grenouille—
a character most will not recognize—for example, was the 18th-century
French orphan in Patrick Süskind’s international bestseller, Perfume: The
Story of a Murderer.63 Jean-Baptiste’s internal struggles with loneliness,
isolation, and desperation to fit in make him all too real.64 Unfortunately,
protecting characters who are “most recognizably human would take too
51 Kurtz, supra note 48, at 464.
52 Id. at 458.
53 Id.
54 Zecevic, supra note 8, at 372.
55 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus., Inc., No. H-82-2377, 1982 WL 1278 at *2
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 1982).
56 Id. at 3.
57 Id.
58 FAQ’s: What Does Copyright Protect?, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright
.gov/help/faq/faq-protect.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2016). The Copyright Office emphasizes that
trademark law may protect some names, but copyright law does not.




63 PATRICK SÜSKIND, PERFUME: THE STORY OF A MURDERER (Vintage Books, 1st ed. 2001).
64 Id.
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much from the public domain, from the common pool of that which is
needed to create.”65
B. TOWLE FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
DC Comics, one of the most distinguished names in the entertain-
ment industry, publishes comic magazines.66 Aside from publishing, a
significant portion of its business is in merchandising and licensing its
Batman trademarks and copyrights.67 From the beginning, Batman has
been depicted in various formats, including movies, comic strips, radio
shows, television, animated movies, and theater.68 One of the most iden-
tifiable elements of the Batman series is a high-tech automobile known
as the Batmobile.69 The 1966 television series, Batman, the 1989 movie,
Batman, the 1992 movie, Batman Returns, the 1995 movie, Batman For-
ever, the 1997 movie, Batman and Robin, the 2005 movie, Batman Be-
gins, and the most recent The Dark Knight Rises all featured different
versions of the Batmobile.70
Mark Towle owns a business creating replicas modeled after vehi-
cles from a variety of television shows and movies.71 He also sells car
kits that allow buyers to customize their own vehicles with various fea-
tures and insignia.72 Towle conducts business through websites such as
www.gothamgarage.net, www.gothamgarage.com, www.marktowle.
com, and www.batmobilereplicas.com, all of which use DC Comics’
trademarks on the site.73
On May 6, 2011, DC Comics filed a complaint against Towle for
copyright infringement and various other causes of action resulting from
Towle’s replicas of the 1966 and 1989 Batmobile.74 Towle denied copy-
right infringement for two reasons: (1) the 1966 and 1989 Batmobiles
were not copyrightable because of their utilitarian functions as an auto-
65 Kurtz, supra note 48, at 465.
66 First Amended Complaint for Copyright Infringement; Trademark Infringement; Unfair
Competition; Trademark Dilution; Declaratory Relief at ¶ 6, DC Comics v. Towle, 989 F. Supp. 2d
948 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (No. CV11-03934 RSWL (OPx)).
67 Id. at ¶ 7.
68 Id. at ¶ 8.
69 Id. at ¶ 7.
70 Id. at ¶ 8-9.




74 Towle, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 954; see also First Amended Complaint for Copyright Infringe-
ment; Trademark Infringement; Unfair Competition; Trademark Dilution; Declaratory Relief at ¶ 7,
DC Comics v. Towle, 989 F. Supp. 2d 948 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (No. CV11-03934 RSWL (OPx)), 2011
WL 6799526 (listing the other causes of action).
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mobile; and (2) DC Comics did not own the copyright to the 1966 and
1989 Batmobiles pursuant to their licensing agreements with third par-
ties.75 The parties then filed subsequent cross-motions for partial sum-
mary judgment with regards to Towle’s laches defense,76 and DC’s
copyright, trademark, and unfair competition claims.77
On February 7, 2013, the district court granted in part and denied in
part DC’s motion for partial summary judgment, and denied Towle’s
cross-motion for partial summary judgment.78 In determining whether
Towle’s replicas of the 1966 and 1989 Batmobile infringed on DC’s cop-
yright protection, the court first analyzed whether a protection existed.79
Towle argued the Batmobile, essentially a car, may not be protected
under copyright law since objects cannot be copyrighted if used for util-
ity.80 A “‘[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural work[ ]’ . . . shall include
works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their
mechanical or utilitarian aspects . . . .”81 To copyright the shape of an
automobile, the design must contain some physical or conceptual feature
“identified separately from, and . . . existing independently of, the utilita-
rian aspects of [that vehicle].”82 Where the shape and utilitarian function
were inseparable, the vehicle was not copyrightable.83
The district court dismissed Towle’s argument and held the
Batmobile was “sufficiently delineated” and therefore entitled to copy-
right protection as a character within the Batman franchise.84 The
Batmobile “exhibited a series of readily identifiable and distinguishing
traits,” including its name and the fact that it was Batman’s personal
vehicle.85 It participated in various pursuits and was deployed against
formidable opponents.86 The Batmobile was a superhero in its own right,
central to Batman’s ability to come out victorious.87 Although variations
75 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 24-31, DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015) (No.
13–55484); see also Notice and Motion of Plaintiff DC Comics’ Motion for Partial Summary Judg-
ment at 1, Towle, 802 F.3d 1012 (No. 13–55484) (listing the third parties as American Broadcasting
Company (“ABC”), Greenway Productions, Inc. (“Greenway”), and Twentieth Century-Fox Televi-
sion, Inc. (“Fox”)).
76 Towle, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 954-55 (“On February 14, 2012, [Towle] filed an Answer, assert-
ing several affirmative defenses, including laches, unclean hands, and fair use.”).
77 Towle, 802 F.3d at 1017.
78 Towle, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 973.
79 Towle, 802 F.3d at 1019, 1023.
80 Brief of Appellee at 40, DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-
55484); see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
81 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
82 Id.
83 Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755 F.3d 1038, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2014).
84 Towle, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 966-68.
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undoubtedly occurred over the years, the Batmobile was always a “swift,
cunning, strong[,] . . . elusive,” and “highly-interactive vehicle, equipped
with high-tech gadgets and weaponry used to aid Batman in fighting
crime.”88 In addition, the Batmobile was “almost always jet black,” and
often contained “bat-like motifs, such as a bat-faced grill or bat-shaped
tailfins in the rear of the car.”89
On February 20, 2013, the parties entered into a joint stipulation in
which they agreed to certain facts and evidence.90 Consistent with that
stipulation, the district court ruled against Towle, enjoining him from
further using the Batmobile in all business-related transactions.91 In addi-
tion, the district court awarded $70,000 to DC Comics.92 Towle filed a
timely appeal.93
II. NINTH CIRCUIT’S THREE-PART TEST ANALYSIS
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit bypassed all analysis of the
Batmobile’s utilitarian function and instead provided a comprehensive
review of precedential cases for copyrighting fictional characters.94 The
court concluded past precedents established the three-part test necessary
for determining whether a character in a comic book, television show, or
movie was entitled to copyright protection.95 First, the character must
generally have “physical as well as conceptual qualities.”96 Second, the
character must be “sufficiently delineated” so as to be recognized as a
particular character.97 Although that character’s appearance may vary, it
must “display consistent, identifiable . . . traits and attributes.”98 Third,
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 957 n.1.
91 Brief of Appellee at 5, DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-
55484).
92 Id. at 5.
93 Towle, 802 F.3d at 1018.
94 Towle, 802 F.3d at 1019-21. Essentially, the Court’s opinion included a discussion of
whether (1) the Batmobile was copyrightable; (2) DC Comics owned a copyright interest in the
Batmobile as it was depicted in the 1966 television show and 1989 movie; and (3) as a matter of law,
Towle was prohibited from asserting a laches defense to the infringement claim. Since this Note
specifically analyzes copyright protections on independent fictional characters, the majority of the
discussion will focus on the first question. Question two is discussed very briefly, while question
three is not discussed at all.
95 Towle, 802 F.3d at 1021.
96 Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978).
97 See Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003).
98 Towle, 802 F.3d at 1021.
10
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the character must be “especially distinctive” and “contain some unique
elements of expression.”99
A visual character with distinct “physical as well as conceptual qual-
ities,” is more likely to contain some unique element of expression.100 In
Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, cartoonists published two comic
book collections depicting over 17 Disney characters engaged in a “free
thinking, promiscuous, drug ingesting counterculture.”101 The cartoonists
portrayed these characters using the same name and remarkably similar
physicality.102 The court explained it would be unreasonable to automati-
cally grant copyright protection to individual, literary characters since it
restricts the creativity of, and raw materials available to, subsequent au-
thors.103 Further, it is difficult to distinctively delineate literary charac-
ters because of the inherent difference in readers’ imaginations.104
However, when the character is visually depicted, it is easier to reconcile
its true nature.105 The court held that since comic book characters were
more easily distinguishable than literary characters, each affected Disney
cartoon character was copyrightable.106 This standard subsequently ap-
plied to television series and movies as well.107
“Sufficiently delineated” characters that display “consistent, widely
identifiable traits” and attributes are especially distinct from stock char-
acters.108 In Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Company, a magician owned the
copyright to a home video revealing several well-known magic tricks.109
Between 1995 and 1997, Fox filmed a series of television specials pre-
mised around exposing the secrets behind famous illusions.110 The magi-
cian filed suit alleging The Mystery Magician, the character in his video,
was copyrightable and therefore Fox infringed upon his copyright.111
The “magician character wore typical magician garb—a ‘black tuxedo
with tails, a white tuxedo shirt, a black bow tie, and a black cape with red
lining[.]’”112 In addition, he only appeared in one home video that sold
99 Halicki Films, Inc. v. Sanderson Sales & Mktg., 547 F.3d 1213, 1224 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 755).
100 Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 755.
101 Id. at 753 (quoting Kevin W. Wheelwright, Note, Parody, Copyrights and the First
Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. Rev. 564, 571, 582 (1976)).
102 Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 753.




107 See Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 1446, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1988).
108 Rice, 330 F.3d at 1175.
109 Id. at 1173.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 1174.
112 Id. at 1175.
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approximately 17,000 copies.113 There, the court held a magician per-
forming tricks and illusions is not sufficiently delineated from all other
stock magicians performing tricks and illusions.114
Characters who are “especially distinctive” and “contain some
unique elements of expression” make it easier to distinguish as copy-
rightable.115 In Halicki Films, Inc. v. Sanderson Sales & Marketing, an
automobile manufacturer created unauthorized replicas of Eleanor, the
sports car from the movie Gone in 60 Seconds.116 The manufacturer used
references to the film and the car when marketing the sale of its mer-
chandise.117 Although the court remanded to the district court the ques-
tion of whether Eleanor was entitled to copyright protection, it provided
significant insight as to what constitutes “especially distinctive.”118 The
court noted three aspects unique to Eleanor: (1) stealing other cars goes
smoothly, but stealing Eleanor always becomes complicated; (2) the
main character personifies Eleanor; and (3) the main character refers to
having a history with Eleanor.119 Even though Eleanor lacked emotional
qualities and could not speak, it can still be a protectable character if it is
“especially distinctive.”120
In applying this three-part test, the court in Towle held the
Batmobile was a fictional character entitled to copyright protection.121
First, the Batmobile had “physical as well as conceptual qualities,” since
it visually appeared in comic books, and was actually depicted in the
television series and movies.122 Second, the Batmobile was “sufficiently
delineated” so as to be recognized whenever it appeared.123 It maintained
“consistent, identifiable character traits and attributes,” such as “its status
as ‘a highly-interactive vehicle, equipped with high-tech gadgets and
weaponry used to aid Batman in fighting crime,’ [and] bat-like . . . ap-
pearance, with a bat-themed front end, bat wings extending from the top
or back of the car, exaggerated fenders, a curved windshield, and bat
emblems on the vehicle.”124 Third, the Batmobile was “especially dis-
tinctive” and “contain[ed] some unique elements of expression,” because
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Halicki, 547 F.3d at 1224; see Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954); see also Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 755.
116 Halicki, 547 F.3d at 1218.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 1225.
119 Id.
120 Towle, 802 F.3d at 1021.
121 Id. at 1026.
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it was a bat-themed sidekick with a recognizable name and distinct phys-
ical attributes.125
Once it established the Batmobile was a copyrightable fictional char-
acter, the court went on to analyze whether DC Comics’ copyright pro-
tection was infringed.126 Copyright ownership initially belongs to the
original creator of the copyrighted work.127 As the copyright owner, DC
Comics enjoyed several exclusive rights, including the right to create
derivative works.128 Copyrightable derivative works use one or more
preexisting works and add new copyrightable material to that work.129
Additionally, DC Comics, as the copyright-holder to the Batmobile, had
the exclusive right to grant others the right to create derivative works.130
Therefore, any third party making unauthorized copies of any copy-
righted derivative work infringes upon the original copyright.131 The
court held DC Comics owned the copyright interest to the Batmobile,
and therefore Towle infringed upon that copyright.132
III. THERE IS ALWAYS ROOM TO IMPROVE: RECOMMENDED FACTORS
In Towle, the court read precedential cases as creating a three-part
test necessary to determine whether a fictional character is copyright-
able.133 Regrettably, this three-part test is not enough to yield predictable
and fair decisions in every similar claim. First, the three-part test merely
combines three standards already in use. It offers little clarification as to
what constitutes “especially distinctive” and “sufficiently delineated.”
Second, the three-part test only covers fictional characters depicted in
comic books, television shows, and movies.134 As it does not clearly ap-
ply to literary works, characters such as Oberyn Martell,135 Bigger
Thomas,136 Behemoth,137 and Mary Katherine Blackwood138 are left ex-
125 Id. at 1022.
126 Id. at 1022-23.
127 U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc. v. Parts Geek, LLC, 692 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir. 2012)
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000)).
128 Towle, 802 F.3d at 1023 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2002)).
129 Parts Geek, 692 F.3d at 1015-16 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010)).
130 Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1992); 17
U.S.C. § 106(2) (2002).
131 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1994).
132 Towle, 802 F.3d at 1024, 1026.
133 Id. at 1021.
134 Id. at 1019.
135 GEORGE R. R. MARTIN, A SONG OF ICE AND FIRE: STORM OF SWORDS, (Bantam ed., 2003)
(the fictional Prince of Dorne).
136 RICHARD WRIGHT, A NATIVE SON, (Harper Perennial ed., 1998) (the 20-year-old
protagonist).
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tremely vulnerable to plagiarism.139 Third, the three-part test fails to re-
solve the question of characters with utilitarian function. It fails to
distinguish between works of applied art, which are copyrightable, with
works of industrial design, which are not.140
There are commentators who think enumerating fictional characters
in the Copyright Act141 would alleviate all issues arising out of this
three-part test.142 However, if copyright protections were automatically
granted to every fictional character, there would be an inevitable
shortage of new artistic creations. As this Note illustrates, ideas build on
ideas, and that is exactly how it should be. Works such as Bridget Jones
Diary,143 50 Shades of Grey,144 and 10 Things I Hate About You145
would never have been created if copyright law were made too restric-
tive. By categorically listing fictional characters, artists would too often
infringe on another’s work simply because they drew inspiration from
that work. Instead, the court should consider additional factors when de-
ciding which fictional characters deserve copyright protection. The three
additional factors are proposed and discussed below.
A. NUMBER OF CHARACTER APPEARANCES IN A SERIES
The development of recognizable qualities can be achieved through
multiple appearances in various works because the character has a
chance to be known. By reviewing a character’s number of appearances
within various works of art, courts can address two of the three limita-
tions of the three-part test. First, it eliminates the concern for characters
serving a utilitarian purpose. The more times a character appears, the
more personality it develops outside of its mere use. As defined by copy-
right law, useful designs are deemed works of art if some feature can be
identified or exist independent of its utilitarian function.146 Second, it
expands the court’s analysis to include fictional characters in literary
works. Literary works are just as numerous and important as comic
137 MIKHAIL BULGAKOV, THE MASTER AND MARGARITA (Diana Burgin & Katherine Tiernan
O’Connor trans., 1995) (the demonic black cat).
138 SHIRLEY JACKSON, WE HAVE ALWAYS LIVED IN THE CASTLE (Penguin Books ed., 1984)
(the 18-year-old narrator).
139 See Towle, 802 F.3d at 1019.
140 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664.
141 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2012).
142 David B. Feldman, Comment, Finding a Home for Fictional Characters: A Proposal for
Change in Copyright Protection, 78 CAL. L. REV. 687, 687 (1990).
143 Adapted from JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE, (Millennium Publications ed., 2014).
144 Fan fiction for STEPHANIE MEYER, TWILIGHT, (Little, Brown and Company ed., 2005).
145 Adapted from WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE SHREW, (Barbara A. Mowat
& Paul Werstine eds., 1992).
146 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2014).
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books, television shows, and movies. If a character makes several ap-
pearances in a variety of works, the author solidifies physical and distin-
guishable traits, unique to that character. A viewer’s understanding of a
character deepens as she becomes familiar with what the character
thinks, feels, says, and does, as well as through the comments of other
characters.147
In New Line Cinema Corporation v. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc.,
a rapper wrote the song, A Nightmare on My Street, and shot a video
about a fictional character named Freddy.148 In the song and video,
Freddy attacked various characters in their dreams.149 One of the charac-
ter’s bedrooms was described as being “engulfed in flames.”150 Another
character woke up from a nightmare only to find Freddy’s hat on her
bed.151 Long before the song and video released, New Line Cinema pro-
duced the Nightmare on Elm Street series, with the main character,
Freddy Krueger.152 Freddy Krueger appeared in nine distinct motion pic-
tures since 1984.153 Throughout that time, Freddy Krueger developed
into a character easily recognized for his six-inch bladed gloves, burnt
face, and ability to kill people in their dreams.154 Taken individually, the
song sounded like the makings of another generic horror movie. Taken as
a whole, however, its lyrics and images substantially mimicked Freddy
Krueger’s qualities and attributes.155 The court held the combination of
similarities between the two works was enough to protect the movie
character of Freddy Krueger under copyright law.156
To illustrate further, the Conan Doyle Estate recently filed a com-
plaint against Miramax over a movie about a retired Sherlock Holmes.157
Even though the author of the beloved series has long since lost his copy-
right ownership to public domain, his characters still qualify for copy-
147 Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir.
1983).
148 New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Grp., Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1517, 1522-23
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
149 Id.
150 Id. at 1522.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Eric Diaz, All 9 A Nightmare on Elm Street Movies, Ranked from Best to Worst, THE
NERDIST (Oct. 31, 2015), http://nerdist.com/all-9-a-nightmare-on-elm-street-movies-ranked-from-
best-to-worst.
154 Biography for Freddy Krueger, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/character/ch0002143/bio
(last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
155 Bertlesman, 693 F. Supp. at 1524.
156 Id.
157 Ted Johnson, ‘Mr. Holmes’ Lawsuit Reaches Settlement, Says Arthur Conan Doyle Estate
Attorney, VARIETY (Sept. 3, 2015), http://variety.com/2015/biz/news/mr-holmes-lawsuit-settlement-
arthur-conan-doyle-1201585667.
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right protection.158 Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson were intelligent
men capable of solving mysteries and crimes through their ability to
think outside of the box. If they only existed in one work, there would be
nothing uniquely distinguishable about them. However, through the span
of their adventures, chronicled in Arthur Doyle’s four novels and 56
short stories,159 Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson became characters
known to the general public. Even those who have never read one of
Doyle’s books can give a general idea of the characters’ friendship and
mannerisms. The author fully developed the individual characters over
the entire series.
B. WHAT THE CHARACTER LOOKS LIKE
Recognition can also be achieved through a character’s physical ap-
pearance because it makes a character easy to recognize. By factoring in
the physical appearance, courts can once again address a limitation to the
three-part test and remedy the gap in coverage for literary characters.
In Warner Brothers, Inc. v. American Broadcasting, Inc., an en-
tertainment studio created a script about a young man who inherited a
suit, which gave him magical powers.160 When he wore the suit, he could
fly, move really fast, and stop bullets.161 The court argued a distinction
must be drawn between a “substantially similar character that infringes a
copyrighted character despite slight differences in appearance, behavior,
or traits, and a somewhat similar though non-infringing character whose
appearance, behavior, or traits, and especially their combination, signifi-
cantly differ from those of a copyrighted character, even though the sec-
ond character is reminiscent of the first one.”162 Simply put, just because
a character is reminiscent of a copyrightable character does not mean
there is an infringement.
Initially, courts reasoned literary characters are not as easily pro-
tected as graphic characters because there is no specific form attached to
the literary creation.163 The author’s mind and the viewers’ imagination
will never agree to the character’s physical appearance, no matter the
amount of detail.164 In addition, considering a character’s appearance
does not allow for the flexibility of characters taking on different forms.
158 Id.
159 ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES: ALL 4 NOVELS AND 56
SHORT STORIES 1 (Bantam Classics ed. 1986).
160 Warner Bros, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 1983).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 242.
163 See Columbia Broad., 216 F.2d at 950.
164 See id.
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However, it is easy to apply copyright protection to characters like The
Hulk, Batman, Mickey Mouse, and Superman because they are physi-
cally easy to recognize. Superman’s red and blue leotard could change
color, but the overall effect of his costume remains the same. Batman
might upgrade his suit, but it will always have the features inherent in his
character.
Physical appearance matters greatly when deciding if fictional char-
acters are distinguishable enough to protect. In Air Pirates, the court said
graphically depicted characters are easy to protect because there is an
image to associate with the character.165 In Rice, the court discussed the
general appearance of the Mystery Magician.166 In Halicki Films, the
court placed no significance on Eleanor being a Fastback Ford Mustang
in one film, and a Shelby GT–500 in another.167 In all three cases, the
court acknowledged a character’s physical appearance in some way.
C. PAINTING THE WHOLE PICTURE OF A SINGLE CHARACTER
Fictional characters are individual parts of the collective whole; and
a character’s particular talents, appearance, and characteristics combine
to make a complete expression.168 By analyzing the entire work, courts
can address all three of the limitations of the three-part test.
To illustrate, James Bond, taken individually, would not be unique
enough to fall within copyright protections. He is a physically fit, charm-
ing, and suave secret agent with access to a slew of technological gadgets
to aid him on his missions.169 He works for the government and has
qualified skills in weaponry.170 That description, unsurprisingly fits hun-
dreds of “super spies” in every action movie ever made—namely, Jason
Bourne,171 Ethan Hunt,172 Bryan Mills,173 and Harry Hart.174 What
makes James Bond distinguishable from all others is the combination of
his personality traits, quirks, mannerisms, thoughts, and typical behav-
iors. Understanding the work in its entirety will not only provide more
predictable and consistent decisions, it will likely result in a fair
outcome.
165 Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 755.
166 Rice, 330 F.3d at 1174.
167 Towle, 802 F.3d at 1020 (citing Halicki, 547 F.3d at 1224).
168 Am. Broad., 720 F.2d at 243.
169 Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1296 (1995).
170 Id.
171 THE BOURNE IDENTITY (Universal Pictures 2002).
172 MISSION IMPOSSIBLE (Cruise/Wagner Productions 1996).
173 TAKEN (20th Century Fox 2008).
174 KINGSMAN: THE SECRET SERVICE (20th Century Fox 2015).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Copyright law protects artistic expressions of an idea, while encour-
aging others to freely build upon the raw ideas themselves.175 It is, there-
fore, paramount to set limits on copyright protection for fictional
characters, as it has the capacity to both enhance and diminish artistic
creativity.176
In Towle, the Ninth Circuit had to decide whether the Batmobile was
a fictional character entitled to copyright protection.177 The court con-
cluded past precedents established the three-part test necessary for deter-
mining whether a fictional character was copyrightable.178 It held the
character must: (1) generally have “physical as well as conceptual quali-
ties,”179 (2) be “sufficiently delineated” so as to be recognized as “dis-
play[ing] consistent, identifiable . . . traits and attributes,”180 and (3) be
“especially distinctive” and “contain some unique elements of
expression.”181
Although the court ultimately reached the correct outcome by ruling
the Batmobile was a character protected under copyright law, the three-
part test used does not ensure a fair and just result in all similar claims.
First, it merely combined three judicial standards already in use without
elaborating on a clearer definition for “especially distinctive” and “suffi-
ciently delineated.”182 Second, it failed to provide guidance with regard
to fictional characters in literary works, limiting the analysis to only
comic books, television shows, and movies.183 Third, it dismissed the
utilitarian function analysis of an automobile, falling short of distinguish-
ing between works of applied art with works of industrial design.184
Many commentators proposed enumerating fictional characters in
the Copyright Act to help alleviate the issues arising out of the three-part
test.185 However, automatic copyright protections would greatly restrict
individual creativity and hinder the objective of copyright law. By ad-
ding additional factors, courts are likely to achieve a consistent, unified
standard. All three of the listed shortcomings can be alleviated or com-
175 Coe, supra note 4, at 1309-10.
176 See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of
1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 590, 590-91 (1987).
177 Towle, 802 F.3d at 1019.
178 Id. at 1021.
179 Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 755.
180 Towle, 802 F.3d at 1021; see Rice, 330 F.3d at 1175; see also Halicki, 547 F.3d at 1224.
181 Halicki, 547 F.3d at 1224.
182 Towle, 802 F.3d at 1021.
183 Id. at 1019.
184 Id. at 1019-20.
185 Feldman, supra note 142, at 687.
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pletely addressed by reviewing: (1) the number of character appearances
in a series, (2) the visual appearance of the character, and (3) the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the claim. This case-by-case analysis
helps address the inherent limitations of the current three-part test, likely
providing more predictable and just results.186
186 See Towle v. DC Comics, 989 F. Supp. 2d 948 (C.D.Cal. 2013), aff’d, 802 F.3d 1012 (9th
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 1390 (2016) (mem.). The Supreme Court denied Towle’s petition
for writ of certiorari regarding the Ninth Circuit’s holding.
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